

# Orange County Fire Authority

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## Coastal Incident

Orange County, CA  
Incident #22-060975

5/11/2022 - 5/17/2022

# AFTER ACTION REPORT

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## Executive Summary



The Coastal Fire was reported on May 11, 2022 at 2:43pm on the Laguna Beach side of Aliso Canyon, north of the South Orange County Wastewater Authority (SOCWA) Coastal Treatment Plant and across Aliso Canyon Road which runs through the bottom of the canyon. Multiple callers reported the fire, which was originally reported as being caused by a “down powerline”.

The Coastal Fire ultimately consumed 202.10 acres comprising 73 acres of unincorporated State Responsibility Area (SRA)-which included Aliso and Woods Canyons Wilderness Park, 31 acres in the City of Laguna Beach, and 98 of acres Local Responsibility Area (LRA) in the City of Laguna Niguel. Twenty homes were destroyed and eleven damaged as a result of the blaze. Two firefighter injuries were reported, numerous areas were under evacuation orders, and no lives were lost. Rates of spread increased as the fire burned into alignment with the steep slope and onshore winds. A spot fire was reported at approximately 3:45pm across the canyon on the Laguna Niguel side. This spot fire grew in size and intensity as it burned up the steep canyon walls moving towards the homes in Laguna Niguel. Mandatory evacuations were ordered by the Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA) and Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) for approximately 900 homes in Laguna Niguel. By 5:00pm there were numerous reports of structures on fire due to the

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fire casting embers into the neighborhood. Firefighters worked throughout the night to save hundreds of homes, assist with evacuating the public, and responding to calls for service.

Given the complexity of the incident, Orange County All-Hazard Incident Management Team #3 (AHIMT #3) was activated at 5:15pm on May 11, 2022. The AHIMT assembled that evening and worked through the entirety of the incident. Unified Command was established between OCFA, Laguna Beach, and the OCSD. The Incident Command Post (ICP) was moved to Laguna Niguel Regional Park at 5:15pm.

Both flanks of the fire were extinguished by a coordinated effort of wildland fire perimeter control tactics. The head of the vegetation fire on the Laguna Niguel side that resulted in the loss of single-family dwellings (in Division M) subsided once the fire had reached the top of the ridge and had no more fuel to burn. The ensuing structure fires as well as both flanks of the vegetation fire were extinguished by a large, multi-agency response of (44) Type I Fire Engines, (17) Type 3 Fire Engines, (3) Patrols, (14) Chief Officers, (2) Dozers, (7) Hand crews, (2) Water Tenders, (4) Safety Officers, (3) Trucks, (1) Air Attack, (10) Air Tankers, and (4) Helicopters. Utilizing pre-established relationships with adjoining agencies, the Master Mutual Aid system, and the Cal OES Bulletin 1 agreement. Additional engines became available through the Expedited Resource Response Plan (ERR) which involved the OCFA Fire Chief contacting the Fire Chiefs of the Los Angeles City Fire Department and the Los Angeles County Fire Department. This vast array of resources was requested, arrived, and deployed on the afternoon of May 11th. Cooperating agencies and stakeholders all proved invaluable to bringing the correct resources together in a timely fashion to mitigate the incident. Coordinated and timely evacuations were ordered and helped contribute to no lives being lost in the face of this fast-moving wildfire. In the end, the Coastal Fire burned 202.10 acres, destroyed 20 structures and damaged 11 structures. 100% containment was announced on May 17th, 2022.



## **Background**




*Photo taken at 15:26 from Pacific Island Drive North of Coronado Point*

### **Fire Behavior Narrative**

On Wednesday, May 11, 2022, unseasonably cool temperatures, and high relative humidity were predicted over coastal Orange County in front of a slow warming and drying trend. Starting Thursday, temperatures were then projected to climb each day through the end of the week, with typical sea breezes returning by Sunday. Despite an ambitious start to the rainy season in December, seasonal rainfall totals were below normal at the time of the fire; consequent to nearly six precipitation free weeks in January and February. Vegetation which would normally take up moisture during mid-winter was beginning to realize this short-term drought stress. Locally measured live fuel moistures were still above critical thresholds, but were more consistent with late-June, than mid-May. The fuel type was best described as densely arranged, contiguous, mature coastal sagebrush and chaparral. Overall, the area of the Coastal Fire had little meaningful recorded fire history. This directly contributed to the amount of available, consumable energy. Since the beginning of 2022, three vegetation fires had already occurred in Orange County. These other fires exhibited similar growth characteristics; primarily as a result of favorable wind and slope



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alignment; but also in large part due to diminished moisture in the heavily loaded, intermixed dead component. Though large fire potential for May 11th was expected to be low due to the aforementioned high humidity and cool temperatures, dead fuel moisture in the newly cured grass and brush components was expected to decline in response to the forecast warming and drying trend on May 12th. During the peak of fire spread on the afternoon of the 11th, winds significantly outpaced forecast model guidance at the Aliso Laguna RAWS (Remote Automated Weather Station); with measured sustained winds up to 20 mph, and gusts to 29 miles per hour.





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### Response

The Coastal Incident was initially reported on a small plateau about 700 feet above the bottom of Aliso Canyon. After approximately 45 minutes of firefighting efforts, winds had increased at the fire's edge, and a spot fire was reported on the Laguna Niguel side of the canyon, opposite from the main fire. After the fire spotted across the canyon, several more spot fires occurred which merged together on the slope. The fire became topographically aligned and advanced up the steep hillside towards the homes that were buffered from the fire by a fuel modification zone. The first homes to be threatened were on Coronado Pointe in the City of Laguna Niguel. As the fire burned upslope, the convected heat of the column resulted in large flame lengths and ember production. The heat energy created by the approaching fire drove past the fuel modification zone and

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deposited embers several streets beyond Coronado Pointe including La Vue, La Port, and Club House Drive.

Based on the reported location of the fire, the first arriving units came onscene from the direction of Pacific Coast Highway and the City of Laguna Beach. The size up from ground units estimated the fire to be at ½ of an acre. The initial attack objectives of the Coastal Incident Commander were to keep the fire from burning further up the western slope of the canyon towards the homes in Laguna Beach, and to keep it from crossing Aliso Canyon Road at the bottom of the canyon. To accomplish these objectives, it was a priority to secure the heel of the fire and to attack the fire directly on the two flanks to keep it from spreading laterally. The initial attack resources were directed to Division A (left flank) and Division Z (right flank) in order to meet these objectives. As the fire grew Division M was established and additional resources were requested. The Initial and Extended Attack resources included (44) Type I Fire Engines, (17) Type 3 Fire Engines, (3) Patrols, (14) Chief Officers, (2) Dozers, (7) Hand crews, (2) Water Tenders, (4) Safety Officers, (3) Trucks, (1) Air Attack, (10) Air Tankers, and (4) Helicopters. The resource requests were rapidly filled by Orange County Fire Authority's Emergency Command Center which became the Unified Ordering Point for the incident. Many neighboring agencies sent resources to help combat the fire including CALFIRE, Metro Net, San Diego, LA County, and Los Angeles City Fire Departments. This list is not exhaustive and all agencies who contributed to the effort are greatly appreciated. Having the immediate Mutual Aid response from neighboring agencies was critical to fire suppression efforts on this incident.



## Narrative



On May 11th, 2022, at 14:43 hours the Orange County Fire Authority Emergency Command Center (OCFA ECC) was notified of a vegetation fire in Aliso and Woods Canyon Wilderness Park near the SOCWA Treatment Plant. With this information OCFA and Laguna Beach Fire each dispatched a Low Watershed Vegetation Response plus additional resources to include:

### **OCFA**

- 1 Battalion Chief
- 3 Type 1 Engines
- 1 Type 3 Engine
- 1 Truck
- 2 Helicopters (ORC HC1 and Duke 1)

### **Laguna Beach**

- 1 Battalion Chief
- 4 Type 1 Engines
- 1 Type 3 Engine

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While units were enroute, several more resources were added to the call. At 15:00 Laguna Beach Battalion 1 (LAB B1) arrived on scene and reported a ½ acre fire that was wind driven, in medium brush, with no homes threatened. LAB B1 established Coastal Incident Command (IC) near the heel of the fire on Aliso Canyon Road by SOCWA. LAB E1 was assigned to the left flank (Division A) and LAB E4 was assigned to the right flank (Division Z). At 15:05 hours Orange County Fire Battalion 6 (ORC B6) arrived on scene and entered Unified Command with LAB B1 stating the fire is approximately ½ to 1 acre in size, well-established in light/medium brush and that the fire is in the SRA and OCFA will be the unified ordering point. Resources that were added to the call enroute were:

### OCFA

- 1 Battalion Chief
- 2 Safety Officers
- Patrol 11
- Patrol 30

The initial Incident Command Post (ICP) was set up off Aliso Canyon Road near the SOCWA Treatment Plant and was later moved to Laguna Niguel Regional Park. The initial incident control objectives were to keep the fire:

- From climbing the northwest slope to Laguna Beach
- To keep the fire from crossing Aliso Canyon Road at the bottom of the canyon

A communication plan was established, ORC B4 was assigned as DIV A, and ORC B7 was assigned DIV Z. As additional ground resources arrived they were assigned to DIV A and DIV Z to reinforce the crews on scene. ORC Helicopter 1 arrived on scene and reported the fire was now approximately 3 acres burning in light/medium fuels and established Coastal Helicopter Coordinator (HLCO).

At 15:33 hours ORC Division 3 arrived at the Incident Command Post (ICP) and assumed Unified IC with LAB B1. ORC B6 was reassigned as Operations. At 15:41 a spot fire was reported across the canyon onto the Laguna Niguel side. DIV M was established to provide structure defense along Coronado Pointe (on the Laguna Niguel side). Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD) personnel coordinated with OCFA to begin evacuating homes in the path of the fire. As the fire made a hard run up the hillside towards Coronado Pointe, air tankers made retardant drops ahead of the fire and Type 1 Engine Strike Teams were positioned in the neighborhood to combat structure fires.

At 17:15 hours OCFA's AHIMT #3 was activated in support of the incident and began operating out of Laguna Niguel Regional Park.

## Successes, Challenges, and Lessons Learned



### Incident Commander

#### Successes

- Unified Command was set up early with the appropriate agencies
- Command and Control established early with Geographic Divisions and resources being utilized
- Coordinated and timely evacuations resulted in no loss of life or serious injury to the public

#### Challenges

- ICP location was difficult due to access, size, proximity to the fire, and poor communications-this created the need to move the ICP
- Communications on FireOC were difficult to hear
- Due to changing complexity, Division M had multiple line leadership changes during the first hour of the structure defense

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- The best access to the fire could have been communicated earlier-computer aided dispatch (CAD) was routing resources through downtown Laguna Beach

### **Lessons Learned**

- Continue to improve communications with Unified ICs to ensure their needs are being met. Be specific with Law Enforcement with expectations on evacuations and repopulation
- Place experienced line leadership on divisions sections of the fire
- It is important to recognize the need for ordering additional aircraft early for a vegetation fire

### **Operations**

#### **Successes**

- Established five (5) divisions to manage perimeter control and structure defense
- OCFA made Unified Ordering Point
- Fire was quickly identified to be in the State Responsibility Area (SRA) which allowed access to state mission resources which included: type 3 engines, state hand crews and firefighting aircraft to meet the state mission
- Evacuation efforts with OCSD were initiated in Laguna Niguel

#### **Challenges**

- Lack of cell phone coverage slowed communications with ECC at the initial ICP
- Identifying control objectives earlier in the incident .
- Ordering resources to meet the current and projected needs of the incident while factoring reflex time.
- Reconciling resources throughout the incident was a challenge. Additional structure fires, medical aids and automatic fire alarms were being dispatched into the fire area
- Some Type 3 engines sat unstaffed at their fire stations due to the cross-staffed front-line engine being dispatched as part of the initial attack

### **Lessons Learned**



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- Initial attack Incident Commanders need to consider augmenting additional resources when in a low watershed for a growing incident
- GEO fence with ECC to ensure accountability of resources being dispatched for service calls within the fire impact area
- The Staging Area Manager should communicate on the VHF command frequency to Operations. 5P is a travel channel and only to be used for engines and the strike team leader while enroute to an incident
- Set control objectives relatively early. Determine where the fire is going and plan where you will be successful with your strategies and tactics.
- When ordering resources, have them report to a specific location such as the heel of the fire, staging or a street within a division and include the district number
- When ordering resources state if they will be for the local mission (LRA) or State mission (SRA)

### Operations - Division A

#### Successes

- Local knowledge of the fire area. CAD was suggesting a route that was not the most direct route. Area familiarization allowed for a more direct access.
- Early notifications to OC Parks Ranger to evacuate the County Park
- Crews from OCFA and Laguna Beach Fire Department had familiarity with the area. Training with both agencies helped with familiarity and effectiveness.
- **Challenges**
- Prioritize radio traffic to avoid excessive radio chatter. Utilize and practice radio discipline so that unnecessary radio traffic doesn't override pertinent communications.
- As a Division Supervisor it was challenging to determine the location of division breaks
- Resource accountability was challenging due to division breaks and access challenges
- Ensure proper safety zones and lookouts are in place when starting a hose lay
- Division A units ran out of wildland hose early in the fire. The lack of type 3 engines on the division contributed to having to place logistical hose orders early in the fire.
- Steep and rugged topography made it difficult to visualize the entire area of Division A.

Maintaining a span of control and effective communications was challenging. Designating one engine Captain to be in charge of the hose lay, one as a point of contact for both crews, and another as a point of contact for both dozers would have helped provide more effective communication.

#### Lessons Learned

- Establish areas of responsibility and division boundaries early.

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- The initial hose lay was placed on an existing trail in a potentially unsafe location. It is the responsibility of the incident commander or division/group supervisor to recognize dangerous situations and make the necessary corrections immediately
- When ordering resources, it is important to consider a couple of factors: forecasting of resource needs and reflex time

### Operations - Division M

#### Successes

- Scouting the fire before assuming Division M provided valuable situational awareness
- Aggressive suppression of all ground fire moving through the ornamental vegetation prevented further structure involvement
- Tactical patrolling picked up numerous spot fires and external fires on structures before the actual structures themselves became involved
- Forming single resource units into Task Forces increased their effectiveness, as well as command and control
- Request to have water pressure boosted resulted in multiple water department personnel arriving on Division M to shut off all non-essential water valves
- Long hose lays supported by Engines on hydrants helped to resolve limited water supply issues
- Utilization of Public Information Officers (PIOs) on the impacted streets to work with media greatly assisted with managing Division M
- OCFA Heavy Equipment was utilized for multiple days on Division M to safely make access to burned out structures in order to assist with suppression and overhaul of hot spots. The excavator and skid steer were utilized to mitigate unsafe walls and overhangs in order to provide access for engine crews to extinguish hidden fire
- OCFA Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) resources (Truck 9 and Heavy Rescue 6), as well as OCFA Heavy Equipment, were utilized to shore up the second story of a single-family residence in order to remove and extinguish hidden fire in a main supporting beam of a house that was partially salvageable
- OCFA Drone Program operators identified numerous hot spots and directed crews in to extinguish them in both the vegetation and the burned-out structures
- Aerial Master Streams were utilized with great success both in initial attack and multiple days later. The size of the buildings and their unstable/unsafe nature made interior fire attack unsustainable. Ground level hose streams had difficulty suppressing fire in the attic and second story of these large 2 story homes

#### Challenges

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- Strong onshore wind influence pushed the fire through many structures and the ornamental vegetation on multiple streets. Fire impacted multiple streets and ultimately spotted over Pacific Island Drive to the south stretching the initial resources
- Large two-story homes between 5000 and 10,000 square feet made suppressing well-involved structures very difficult
- Engine companies attempting to suppress attic and second story fires had limited effect with ground level hose lines due to the size and height of many of the structures
- Units responding into the impact area on additional incidents such as structure fire responses and automatic fire alarms were operating on traditional 800 MHz radio frequencies and were not assigned to the fire. This made communication and resource allocation challenging until resolved
- Low water pressure became an issue early into the operational period due to the many large structure fires being fought by multiple truck and engine companies
- Multiple hazards were encountered consisting of a running fuel fire, building collapse, significant ammunition involved in fire, multiple explosions and electric vehicles burning

### Lessons Learned

- Early engagement of local water department representatives assisted with ensuring a continuous water supply
- As water pressure decreased in the impact area, long supply hose lays to further out hydrants were necessary. Supporting the hose lays with an engine on the hydrant and relay pumping to engines engaged in fire suppression was essential
- As the fire was moving from house-to-house Aerial Master Streams were effective in reaching and suppressing fire in attics and the second stories of very large two-story homes where ground level hose lines had limited effect
- Identifying the boundaries of the impact area of Division M early, and ensuring that calls for service into the impact area are coordinated through the Coastal Fire IC would have prevented numerous single resource units from responding into Division M without the proper communications package, or knowledge of the division supervisor
- Utilization of specific OCFA Specialty resources, such as the OCFA Heavy Equipment program, Drone program, and the USAR program, to abate hazards and assist with limiting further fire spread and destruction was extremely helpful. These resources were able to provide significant assistance
- Tactical Patrolling in conjunction with Anchor and Hold tactics suppressed numerous ground and spot fires that could have burned more structures

### Operations - Division Z

#### Successes

- Hose plumbed around most of the fire in the first 24 hours

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- Coordinated efforts with the dozer helped slow the perimeter growth throughout the night
- OCFA hand crew was extremely effective establishing perimeter control during the first operational period.

### Challenges

- As division supervisors, ensure the divisional boundaries are clear and defined.
- Type 1 engines have only a limited amount of hose, order Type 3 engines specifically for their wildland hose complement as well as their other wildland specific capabilities (i.e., chainsaws and hand tools)
- Advise logistics of cell signal and radio connectivity issues early to facilitate mobile repeater placement to improve communications
- Look for opportunities to place drop points on the map to assist in later operational periods for reporting locations and logistical support
- Clearly identify and broadcast the best route for access as soon as possible for all additional resources

### Lessons Learned

- Order resources for the current operational period as well as identifying needs for the next operational period.





## Emergency Command Center (ECC)

### Successes

- The ECC formed and dispatched seven (7) initial attack ORC strike teams, and added four (4) OCFA engines to an XOR strike team
- The ECC still maintained coverage within OCFA
- No 911 calls went unanswered
- Off-duty ECC staff came into work as the incident escalated and staff continued to support new incidents
- The Duty Chief and ECC Duty Officer worked with the Floor Supervisor and modified the structure fire responses
- The incident transitioned early and smoothly into Expanded Dispatch and the staff supported the DOC

### Challenges

- ECC dispatched the Green Type 3 Strike Team including E350. (E50 was already at the incident and was eventually replaced with E339)
- Strike Teams leaders and engines had difficulty knowing their reporting location

6/21/2022 06:42:38 5304	[1] JAAK ST1416A NPBB6 E45 E19 E38 E31 NPBE63 REPORTING LOCATION: CORONADO POINTE x PACIFIC ISLAND JAAK
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- Type 1 Strike Team requests were sent to California Southern Region, causing a delay in getting the Strike Teams filled
- Difficult to get clear direction from the IC, OES, or Cal Fire regarding what agreement requests were being ordered

### Lessons Learned

- Strike Team reporting locations have been identified as an issue for recent vegetation fires.

## ECC Duty Officer (EDO)

### Successes

- Utilize the DOC Rapid Attack Mobilization Plan guidebook (RAMP)
- ECC created a document that was “living” during the incident that identified what resource was in what station. This was extremely helpful in identifying the needs of the agency for overall coverage

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### Challenges

- ECC sent independent structure fire responses inside of the Coastal Fire impact area
- Should have MPC staffing representatives from T22 located in the DOC as soon as possible
- Use and follow the EDO Vegetation fire checklist

### Lessons Learned

- Identify/highlight Gray Book stations, priority stations, as well as the last stations to be filled to match the RAMP guidebook during internal disruption or a MAJOR incident
- Contact Communication Services with any DOC activation
- Contact IT Supervisor with any DOC activation
- When the OC Alert goes out, provide direction and specifically a dedicated phone number for all off duty personnel to use when they call in. This takes calls from the dispatch floor and sends them directly to staffing in the DOC
- OOS at a double company house means the cross staffed apparatus may still be available for example, E-50 or E-350
- Any orders outside of the Appendix A agreement coming from IC or DOC need to be identified if it will be on the state or local mission. This will assist with the 213 and the request through South Ops
- Make an announcement to the field once the decision is made to go to modified structure fire dispatch levels:
- Place T-22 Out-of-Service (OOS) to facilitate communications with Duty Manpower Coordinators
- During the first operational period the DOC EDO and the Floor EDO should meet every hour on the hour to reconcile needs and orders filled
- After the first operational period the DOC EDO and the floor EDO should meet every other hour on the hour, specifically at 5pm and 5 am to confirm with the ROC and or 209 reporting

### *OCFA Department Operations Center (DOC)*

#### Successes

- Decision was made early to open the DOC
- Additional ECC Duty Officer/Battalion Chief (EDO) was brought in to assist the on-duty EDO
- EDO's split assignments: one worked in the DOC and the other continued to help run day to day operations in the ECC
- Many people assisted in the DOC and took on multiple roles

#### Challenges

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- There were not enough qualified, on-duty DMPCs at the fire station compared to the need for them to help out
- Ensuring Expanded Dispatch was getting all the information they need to IROC in a timely manner
- Getting personnel to respond to AlertOC

### Lessons Learned

Need more personnel to fill positions in the DOC including to assist with logistical needs that arise

- Need to have current copies of the RAMP plan in the DOC
- Communicate more frequently with South Ops when utilizing Bulletin 1 to keep them informed
- Floor EDO and the DOC EDO need to keep in consistent communication



### Air Operations

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### Successes

- Early communication between Air Attack and OCFA HC1 on fire orientation and objectives
- Ordering of Air assets handled by Air Attack early in the incident (facilitated timely and efficient ordering of quantity/type of aircraft needed)
- Coordination of geographical areas for helicopter use, and assignments made based on control objectives and priorities
- Effective management of the fire traffic area provided for safe and effective use of both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft throughout the incident
- Continued effective aerial firefighting throughout the night utilizing OCFA HC1
- Laguna Beach HeloPod provided for firefighting effectiveness due to close proximity to the fire and ease of use for helicopters

### Challenges

- HC1 was the only helicopter available at the time of dispatch for OCFA, which limited the initial effectiveness of aerial firefighting
- Due to the limited helicopters in the initial stages of the fire, HC1 functioned as a “Working” or “Tactical” HLCO.
- Air to ground radio frequencies are line of sight only, which led to radio traffic being missed between HC1 and IC in the initial stages of the fire

### Lessons Learned

- Early request for Air Attack and fixed-wing aircraft when an incident is located in the SRA, or a threat to the SRA
- Early recognition of the need for additional rotary wing and fixed wing firefighting aircraft is crucial
- Utilize the initial helicopter on scene to identify fire potential, access points, and priority flanks to assist in building your plan
- Updating objectives and priorities should be a continuous/ongoing process between IC/OPS and Air assets





### **Community Risk Reduction (CRR)**

#### **Successes**

- The Homeowner's Association (HOA) had just been inspected for Fuel Modification requirements and was found in compliance
- OCFA and the HOA have a good working relationship. The HOA had replaced the acacia behind the fences with ice plant and was in the process of removing/replanting vegetation on interior slopes to reduce receptive fuel bed risk
- Fuel modification of 130' was clear and annually maintained from fence line downslope

#### **Challenges**

- Home hardening messages have been delivered to the area for 20 years with no visible action
- 1/4" mesh was found on vents allowing ember intrusion
- Non-combustible roofs were built before the "system" of having underlayment beneath the tile, allowing ember intrusion
- DINS (damage assessment) needs to be ordered early in the process

#### **Lessons Learned**

- Increase awareness that OCFA has a Damage Assessment Inspection Team (DINS)
- Establish partners in the delivery of the home hardening message



### *Staffing/Duty Manpower Coordinators (DMPC)*

#### **Successes**

- Early communication with DOC staff requesting updates
- Successful call back of multiple Duty Manpower Coordinators (DMPC) from home
- Coordinated with DOC to establish a priority for staffing vacant fire stations
- Successfully staffed all vacancies except for a few 100 series engines
- Successfully utilized the text message notification to alert available personnel of the major emergency and numerous vacancies needing to be filled

#### **Challenges**

- T22 was available for calls, and this interrupted the process of staffing the department
- Duty Manpower Coordinator (DMPC) did not have a clear list of units assigned to the fire
- Identifying individual engines on the strike teams took extra time
- Incorrect relief vehicle status delayed the process of staffing fire stations
- Accountability for relief apparatus, EMS gear, and communication kits was out of date and delayed the process of staffing fire stations
- Accountability for personnel was a challenge. Some personnel changed stations or left stations without informing the DMPC
- Units were dispatched to 911 calls for service within the fire area and became part of the incident. Because they were not assigned to the Coastal Fire, they did not show up in any lists and DMPC did not know they were assigned

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### **Lessons Learned**

- There is a shortage of qualified Duty MPCs. Having a Duty MPC representative at the DOC will help. But the first operational period needs as many Duty MPC's working at 22's as possible.
- Estimated commitment times should be passed on to DMPC.
- DMPC needs a way to confirm the people assigned to the engines. This way they can staff for tomorrow and subsequent days
- For in-county fires, consider utilizing the 100 series engines for the initial backfill of stations, even if their front-line units were not assigned to the actual incident. For instance, utilize the unit/gear/comms from E125 to cover another station other than 25's (E125 in service as E922) instead of sending the same personnel to HQ to find a relief engine, locate EMS gear, locate communication gear, etc.

### **ACTION ITEMS**

#### **Operations**

- Make a determination about filling strike teams with closest resources for Initial Attack strike teams
- Identify a process for staffing of type 3 engines that are unmanned in the fire stations during the initial attack phase
- Identify a more efficient way for strike teams to know the location in which they are requested to respond to

#### **Emergency Command Center (ECC)**

- For in-county strike team requests for type 3 engines, dispatch the closest Battalion Chief and five closest Type 3 Engines for Initial Attack or the predetermined strike team for the planned need. Validate how IC or Operations is requesting the strike team and what the mission is for.
- Make contact with Strike Team Leaders on 5 Papa to provide resources assigned and reporting location
- All Type 1 Strike Team requests need to go to OES Region 1,
- Review recent training with Cal Fire Contact County Chief regarding agreements and the ordering process
- The ECC will prompt the IC if the requested resources are for the state or local mission

#### **Department Operations Center/ECC Duty Officer (DOC/EDO)**

- Establish regular contact with the Resources Unit at Incident Plans

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- Send updated strike team rosters to Duty Manpower Coordinators (DMPC) and Resources Unit
- Coordinate with Cal Fire for SRA reporting of ROC and 209 information
- Develop a program to create surge units in CAD to decrease mobilization time and allow other groups to perform vital functions
- Ensure Administrative Fire Captains are familiar with DOC Operations so that more people can be utilized in emergency incidents

### **Duty Manpower Coordinator (DMPC)**


- Send a MPC representative to the DOC
- Ensure that relief vehicle status and loaner gear accountability is updated regularly
- Ensure accountability for personnel checking in with DMPC and updating staffing when moving stations or going home
- Confirm through the DOC who the contact person is in the Resources Unit at Incident Plans and establish regular check-ins

### **Community Risk Reduction (CRR)**


- Find out who/whom the WERT, BARC, or report memo go to on an incident. Wildland Pre-Fire is often the recipient, and it is unclear who needs to have it
- Take a more pro-active approach in obtaining message delivery partner
- Continue to monitor grant availability for home hardening improvements; Track legislation and code activity for opportunities to require retrofitting.



# Operations Map




# Fire History Map





# Direct Protection Area (DPA) Map



## Coastal Incident, Orange County CA, OCFA INC# 22-060975

### Timeline of Events

5/11/22:

- 14:45 ECC received the first of multiple reports of a 50' x 50' vegetation fire near the water treatment plant in Aliso Canyon. Location given is The Ranch Resort 31106 Pacific Coast Highway.
- 14:47 OCFA ECC dispatched a Low Watershed Vegetation Fire response
- 14:47 Laguna Beach Fire Command Center dispatched their own Low Watershed Response
- 14:52 OCSO Helicopter Duke 1 arrives overhead and confirms an active fire, provides a size up from overhead. Duke 1 provides further details on location.
- 15:00 LAB B1 arrived on scene and established Coastal IC and sizes up fire at approximately ½ acre, wind driven, burning medium brush, no homes threatened, and access issues.
- 15:01 Laguna Beach PD begins evacuating Ben Brown's Golf Course
- 15:03 LAB E3 begins perimeter control on the left flank and becomes DIV A
- 15:05 ORC B6 arrives on scene and enters Unified Command with LAB B1, sizes up fire at ½-1 acres, well-established, burning in light to medium brush.
- 15:08 LAB E4 begins perimeter control on the right flank and becomes DIV Z
- 15:10 Unified IC declares fire is in the SRA, OCFA will be the ordering point, dispatch the (5) closest engines, a chief officer, and page all Water Tenders to report to the golf course
- 15:12 ORC HC1 arrives on scene and says fire is approximately (3) acres, light to medium fuels, power lines threatened, small spot up canyon away from main body
- 15:16 ORC Ops Chief, in the ECC, requests (2) additional, any type, water dropping helicopters
- 15:20 ORC B4 assumes DIV A
- 15:26 Unified IC requests fixed wing. 1 Air Attack and 2 Air Tankers are ordered.
- 15:29 Unified IC requests (1) Type III Strike Team to report to golf course
- 15:33 ORC T49 assigned Staging at the corner of PCH and golf course drive.
- 15:33 ORC Division 3 assumes UIC with LAB B1, ORC B6 becomes Coastal Operations
- 15:40 (1) Immediate Need Type 1 Strike Team requested to respond to Coronado Pointe
- 15:41 Operations advises there is a spot fire across the canyon, assigns HC1 to the spot fire.
- 15:42 ORC B7 assumes DIV Z
- 15:43 Fire reported on Laguna Niguel side of the canyon
- 15:44 (2) additional safety officers are ordered
- 15:47 Operations request a second hand crew



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- 15:51 Operations orders B5 to Coronado Pointe to assess structure threat
- 15:53 Air Attack orders (2) additional tankers from (11) miles out
- 15:54 Operations requests a second Type 1 Strike Team to Coronado Pointe
- 15:57 Air Attack 310 arrives on scene and establishes Coastal Air Attack
- 16:00 Type 1 Strike Team ordered to respond to Moulton Meadows (Laguna side of fire)
- 16:04 ORC Division 2 becomes the initial DIV M tasked with Structure Defense
- 16:05 Air Attack orders (2) additional tankers and closest Type 1 helicopter
- 16:11 First Type 1 engines arrive on Coronado Pointe
- 16:17 Division Mike reports that the fire is impacting the homes on Coronado Pointe
- 16:24 (2) Golf Strike Teams are requested to report to the fire
- 16:36 Begin to get reports of fires in the backyard of residences on Vista Montemar
- 16:43 Division Mike requests a third Type 1 Strike Team requested to Coronado Pointe/Pacific Island
- 16:56 ORC E24 reports structures on fire on La Vue
- 16:58 ORC Division 10 assumes Operations
- 17:07 (2) Type 1 Strike Teams of the closest resources requested to DIV M
- 17:07 ICP moved to Laguna Niguel Regional Park
- 17:13 Staging is moved to the Ziggurat in Laguna Niguel
- 17:15 ORC Division 1 assumes IC and OCFA IMT #3 begins transition of management of the Coastal Incident at Laguna Niguel Regional Park
- 17:16 Operations requests 2 additional qualified Division Supervisors
- 17:27 ORC Intel 24 enroute from Chino for aerial reconnaissance and intelligence support
- 17:35 Operations requests (5) Type 3 strike teams and (5) Hand Crew strike teams for the state mission
- 17:35 ORC B36 assumes DIV M
- 17:35 Operations requests the 5 closest Type 1 engines to report to DIV M
- 17:53 Operations provides update: fire is now 200 plus acres, and updates incident objectives are to keep the fire out of Laguna Beach and continue structure defense in Laguna Niguel.
- 18:10 Operations provides update: fire is holding at approximately 200 acres and multiple structures are involved in fire
- 18:39 Operations requests a representative from Moulton Niguel Water District. Numerous structure fires are taxing the water system in the area.
- 19:11 Coastal Air Attack begins releasing aircraft as night fall approaches.

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20:09 Coastal Air Attack returns to base for the night

20:41 Operations requests an engine to support a ground fill operation for ORC HC1 at Tivoli Helibase  
in support of nighttime air operations

22:48 Some Initial Attack resources start to be released.

**5/12/22:**

00:23 ORC HC1 returning to FS41 for the night

07:00 OCAHIMT facilitates first operations briefing for incoming day resources

08:00 OCAHIMT officially in command

**5/17/22:**

08:00 Full containment is declared